Concessions in conversation 1 have been treated rather formally, and perhaps literally, as 'a participant's agreeing to the central issue after his or her prior disagreement' (Kotthoff, 1993: 193), and 'illustrat[ing] that the caller is aware of all sides of the argument and has weighed the possibilities before coming to a decision' (Liddicoat et al., 1994: 147). It seems to us that there is more to it than that, at least for a certain sort of concession-making that has not, so far as we know, been remarked upon before. This article is about the rhetorical effect, not of simply 'conceding', but of making a show of conceding. Here is an example of what we mean:
Show concessions C H A R L E S A N TA K I L O U G H B O RO U G H U N I V E R S I T Y M A RG A R E T W E T H E R E L L O P E N U N I V E R S I T Y
A B S T R AC T Making a show of conceding by using a three-part structure of proposition, concession and reassertion has the effectin contrast to other ways of conceding -of strengthening one's own position at the expense of a counter-argument. This three-part structure can be also exploited so as to carry the battle to the enemy, as it were, and make the concession do more offensive work. We detail three such ways: Trojan Horses where the speaker imports a caricature of the opposition into the conceded material; stings in the tail, where the speaker specifically overturns the concession they have just made in the original claim; and cheapeners, where the speaker works pragmatically to devalue even a positive endorsement of the opposition's case. In all their variety, what marks the concession as being hearably in the speaker's own interest is the robust, normative three-part proposition -concession -reprise structure. It is available for use in supporting or demeaning any position, whether mundane or explicitly ideological.
(1) Sedge, p 16.mw 1 Resp there's no way I can influence 2 the Federation of Labour 3 I might hate them you know 4 Int yeah 5 Resp willing to go out and shoot the 6 Int yeah 7 Resp whole lot of them. But 8 Int ((explosive 9 laughter)) 10 Resp I can't influence them.
There is something more than mere agreement here, or the speaker simply illustrating knowledge of other points of view. Perhaps if the words were rearranged into a question-and-answer exchange, such that the speaker was asked 'but you do accept that you have a negative attitude towards the Federation of Labour?' and the respondent simply said 'yes', then it would sound like a yielding, dictionary-definition concession. That is not what is happening here. What is happening is, we think, that the speaker is building up his talk so as to make a show of conceding a point. He is drawing attention to his concession, and by doing so he is realizing a very particular rhetorical effect.
To uncover what that is, we borrow a leaf from those who treat shows and displays of 'cognitive' phenomena -a display of 'understanding' or 'illustrating that the [speaker] is aware of all sides of the argument' (Liddicoat et al., 1994) -not cognitively, but rather as a show, a piece of interactional business. That means following the ethnomethodological principles visible in such work as that of Coulter on mind (Coulter, 1989) , or its properties (like recall; Drew, 1989) and specifically in the discursive psychology of 'social cognition' where attitudes and attributions (Edwards and Potter, 1992) , accounts and explanations (Antaki, 1994) , emotions, scripts and categories (Edwards, 1997) and, indeed, reasoning in general (Billig, 1987) are taken to be interactional matters, deployed to rhetorical advantage.
The aim of this article, then, is to add to the discursive psychology of cognitive phenomena in talk, and to consider just what it is that making a show of a concession does. We shall argue that what it does is to attend, in general, to what Edwards and Potter (1992) call the speaker's 'stake' or interest in the matter at hand, and specifically, to the disputability of some claim that the speaker has just articulated. We shall try to show that it does these things by the robust cradle of an exploitable, normative, three-part conversational structure.
'Show' concessions have a proposition-concession-reprise structure
The basic conversational structure we have uncovered makes a show of a concession by (loosely speaking): (i) saying something vulnerable to challenge; (ii) conceding something to that challenge; then (iii) qualifying that concession and reasserting what one first said. More formally, the structure has: (1) We shall be saying a good deal more about the construction of that three-part sequence in the body of the article. For the moment let us take two cases to start with. We should make a note here that our examples throughout the article come from a range of sources. 2 To help the exposition, we have marked extracts so as to identify key elements more clearly: we have put propositions and their reprise in italics, and concession and contrast markers in bold, and added a gloss on the right-hand side.
In the first example, the talk is about making beer at home. Consider how the speaker 'makes a show' of their concession by proposing something, conceding counter-evidence, and then restating the original proposition: (2) Note two things. One is the bracketing structure, in which an echoing pair of propositions draw attention to the concession. We discuss this later in detail. Note too the rhetorical effect. The speaker's original position was an extreme case formulation ('the only thing [. . .] you can vary is really . . .') and such a description of a state of affairs, as Edwards and Potter (1992) point out, is particularly liable to simple disconfirmation. There are, after all, other things you can vary in brewing beer. So were the speaker to have left it at that, he would be liable to the challenge that he was 'overstating the case', 'being dogmatic' and so on.
That is a danger, and the speaker immediately moves to defend against it. He does so by making an explicit show of conceding something and then immediately reprising his original statement. That calls attention, in a rhetorical fanfare, to the fact that he is all too aware of the simple challenge to his statement, and easily rebuts it ('well you can vary anything'), making his original claim sound stronger and better defended. It is, of course, in fact exactly the same claim. Here is another example of the same thing: Note two things again: the three-part structure of proposition, concession and reprise, and the rhetorical effect. The speaker's case (in lines 1-2) is that (New Zealanders are) 'not um spoilt in the respect as I think Americans are'. Such a description of a state of affairs is, as before, inevitably challengeable. It is open to the simple challenge that it cannot apply to all New Zealanders, and the speaker risks sounding dogmatic and opinionated, as before. Indeed the interlocutor's 'what too much material goods?' points to how his claim might be punctured; surely some New Zealanders have too many cars, houses, domestic appliances and so on?
Again, the speaker moves immediately to delete such an implication in her position. She concedes: 'allright, there's always you-um extremes [. . .] there are a few'. In this environment it is hard to see this as being merely an illustration of the speaker's awareness that there is another point of view. It is much more readily hearable as being a description 'organised to undermine or reject an alternative that may be either implicit or explicit' (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 3) . And, again, she moves to reprise of the original proposition 'but basically the average New Zealander is [. . .] unspoilt'. This seems to put a cap on it, to roll up the sequence into an integrated structure. Taken all together, that triad of proposition, concession and reprise undoes any 'conceding' that the single line 'there's always you-um extremes' would do on its own (say, in isolated reply to a question). Delivered as it is, it has (in a way we spend the rest of the article unpicking) the rhetorical effect of bolstering the speaker's original proposition against implied (or explicit) challenge, and weakening, or even dismissing, the counter case.
Our argument, then, is that making a show of conceding bolsters the speaker's case and weakens its counter, and is to be heard as an alternative to other ways of conceding, which do not. Making a show of conceding fire-proofs something in the speaker's own position, making it less liable to challenge, upset or rebuttal. Let us turn to some examples of alternative ways of conceding which do not have this effect. Then we can progress on to spend more time on seeing how the three-part structure is built.
OTHER WAYS OF CONCEDING ARE NOT HEARABLY DEFENSIVE
Concessions have different rhetorical effects in different environments: agreement, acquiescence, correction, yielding, and so on. Here we describe two, to illustrate the difference with conceding in the three-part structure we have in mind. One way of expressing a concession without making a show of it is in ('merely') replying to a challenge from another party, and indeed this is perhaps the commonest way of thinking of 'concession' elsewhere in the literature -it is that sort of concession, we think, that Kotthoff (1993) The question-answer format makes us hear that A simply concedes that she was wrong; there is no showcase three-part structure and nothing defensive about the concession, unlike examples 2 and 3. Compare it with this, made-up, version:
(4a) A fictional, three-part version of (4) In that fictional version, the arrows show how we have intervened to change example 4 so that, now, all the features of the structure are there: disputable proposition, concession marker, but, and reprise. The result is that we do hear the concession as attending to a challenge, and disarming it.
Another example of a concession not in a showcase structure is this one, where what prompts B's concession is not a direct challenge as in the previous case, but rather something more implicit. Again, the concession (at line 5) is a simple agreement which comes across as co-operative and affiliative. into it according to this map anyway ((laughs)) → 5 B oh well it could be 6 it doesn't say where it changes here (---) 7 it could change from Fleet actually it could be 8 three er one one from Fleet
As before, we could talk that up into a combative concession like this:
(5a) fictional reworking of (5) Once again we have invented dialogue to make a showcase of proposition, concession and reprise; with the addition of the arrowed material, the speaker does sound as if they are protecting their claim against attack.
These two examples hardly exhaust the many ways in which concessions do their rhetorical business, but do, we hope, serve as simple illustrations of the case we want to make; namely, that the way a concession is done tells us something about its effect. Not making a show of it tends towards making it sound like its 'literal', dictionary definition of agreement and yielding. Now let us consider how a speaker can go about making a show of his or her concessions, and delve further into the rhetorical effects of that show.
Participants' display of, and orientation to, the three-part structure
Recall that we said that the outline of the structure is like this:
1. Material that could reasonably be cast as being a challengeable proposition, or having disputable implications 2. Okay / allright / of course / you know or other concessionary marker, plus material countable as evidence against the challengeable proposition, or its implications 3. But / nevertheless or other contrastive conjunction plus (some recognizable version of ) the original proposition
It is important to be clear that it is the participants in the interaction, by virtue of their orientation to the talk, who show us that the three-part concession structure is operative and not analysts' interpretation or idealization (for more on this conversation-analytic approach to argument structures in general, see Coulter, 1990; Antaki, 1994; Hutchby, 1996; Muntigl and Turnbull, 1998) . There are two sorts of evidence that the interaction displays: one is the speaker's use of specific markings, which we describe in the following section; and the other is the speaker and hearer's collaboration in building up the proposition-concessionreprise structure together, which we will discuss later.
MARKERS
The double hinge around which the talk swings are the concession marker ('ok', 'sure', 'fair enough' and so on) and the reprise marker (usually 'but').
First, the concession marker ('ok' and so on). In general, we found that markers were usually concessionary in the sense of conceding evidence: okay . . ., allright . . ., obviously . . ., I agree . . ., granted . . ., fair enough . . . . Sometimes the marker would be a modal verb doing service of conceding in the sense of (figuratively) granting permission (you can . . .) or in the sense of citing possibility (. . . you can have . . .). Multi-purpose knowledge or clarification expressions like I mean and You know also seemed to work as concession markers. And, of course, there are combinations of all of these.
The concessionary particle does three things. First, it does something retrospective. It casts what has gone before as being in some way 'disputable', as Jackson and Jacobs (1980) would call it. Or, as the discursive psychologists have it, using a particle like okay (and so on) is to cast what has gone before as somehow dangerous to one's presumed impartiality in the matter (Edwards and Potter, 1992) . Second, and at the same time, the 'ok' calls the participants' attention to the source in which the later reprise will find its original proposition. Third, the concession marker does something prospective: it introduces what is to come immediately next as being material offered as counter-evidence to (what it has just cast as) the proposition.
In the following case, notice how the marker in line 11 ('I mean ok'): (a) makes everything in lines 1-8 disputable, or a source of unwanted implication; (b) makes it a source of what might later be reprised as the proposition; and (c) introduces the material in lines 11-13 as being a concession to the other side: Now let us move to the second of the two markers which form the basis of the structure, the reprise marker (in the example, the 'but' at line 14). This signals that the concessionary material is over and heralds that what is to come is in opposition to what has gone before. The obvious contrastive marker is the disjunction in but (see, for example, the discussion of but in Schiffrin, 1987 , and the formal account in Grote et al., 1997) and indeed this was by far the most commonly used contrast in our data (though there were occasional sightings of nevertheless, whereas and anyway).
It is important to note that what comes after the reprise marker has to be a recognizable reprise of the original proposition, or the structure might not achieve hearable closure. This bears emphasis: it is only by repeating (a version of ) something that came earlier that the speaker actually specifies exactly what it is in what was said earlier that counts as a defensible a 'proposition' at all, and publicly calls attention to their talk as to be heard as a cycle. In the 'Charles and Di' example, note how the words 'you don't want to know' at line 14 are an echo of exactly the same phrase at line 7.
It is a matter of discovery in the text just how far back a speaker can go, and how far they can change the wording, and still produce a 'recognizable' reprise of earlier material. Presumably there are limits, though it is hard to be precise about them. In any case, if the showcase is to be immediately and unmistakeably clear to all, then the reprise will refer to something not far away and use some similarsounding form of words. The closer, lexically and temporally, the reprise is to the original proposition, the more powerful the showcasing effect is, as in example 1, about the Federation of Labour, and the following one: (7) Here the dismissal is sharp and pithy, with the feel of deliberate rhetoric. But this close clustering and exact mimicry is not obligatory; we found many examples where the structure was still visible, and the dismissive effect still forceful, even though the reprise referred to something a little way back, and not in exactly the form originally used. For example, in the following case, the speaker has picked out 'they should be able to come and play sport' (lines 1-2) from the preceding talk to reprise as 'they should be able to play' (line 20): However, too much deviation from closeness in form and in time would risk the reprise not being heard, and the structure misfiring.
ENSEMBLE CONSTRUCTION AND SELF-REPAIR
The reprise, concessionary and contrast markers are the backbone of the structure, and give one kind of visible evidence that it is in operation. The other evidence comes from the way the participants in the interaction deliver their talk. In the following example, two participants, F and D, join together to make a show of F's concession. That could only come off if there were expectable slots into which the independent speakers could coordinate one action. See how F and D construct the three-part structure jointly. It is F who provides the raw material (lines 1-4) which might later be picked up in a reprise; then he does a concession (starting with 'I mean', lines 4-8). D precisely times and marks her intervention (starting with 'yeah but', line 9) to be heard as a reprise. And then F takes the reins again (line 11) to elaborate the original proposition. The whole sequence comes out as something like: 'we're the envy of the world cos we've got 'em no other count-I mean you've got these kings of Spain and kings of somewhere or other, but they're not like our Queen, we have got a tradition of Royalty which dates back . . .'. This interweaving between two speakers is a good example of completion (Díaz et al., 1996; Lerner, 1991) , where a structured conversational device is realized in the voice of more than one person.
In the second of our two examples to show participants' orientation, consider the way that the speaker corrects herself in line 8: It is possible to read the 'I mean' repair in line 8 as a way of turning the utterance into one that explicitly signals that this is a concession in a three-part structure. Turning it into the proposition -concession -reprise structure is a way the speaker can attend to something vulnerable about her opening position, namely that she is fussing about nothing; the purse might have been emptied by the robbers. By turning her 'I don't care' explicitly into a concession, she repairs that implication and can reassert her complaint that it is the length of time that annoys her.
How the structure can be exploited to carry the battle to the opposition
The argument so far has tried to establish that there is a three-part structure, oriented to by participants, which is heard as bolstering the speaker's own position. It is important to repeat that the structure by itself manages this bolstering and, by implication, the weakening of the counter case. That is what it is rhetorically for: to be a contrast with other ways of doing concessions, which do not have that effect. But the structure can -also -be exploited not simply to defend the speaker's own position against suspicion or attack, but actually to strike a positive blow against the opposition. In the rest of this article we describe three ways in which this can be done:
1. Trojan Horses, which work by smuggling in a caricature description of the other side's case, by casting it in extreme-case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) or as an impossible description (Torode, 1996) , or by trivializing it. 2. Stings in the tail, which amplify the combative force of the concession by reprising the orginal proposition as a specific reversal of the conceded material. 3. Cheapeners, which work by pragmatically devaluing something ostensibly positive about the opposition case.
TROJAN HORSES SMUGGLE IN CARICATURE DESCRIPTIONS
First we turn to how the structure can be used as a sort of Trojan Horse. The speaker can use the rib-cage of proposition and reprise to carry inside it a caricature of the other side's case. According to Pomerantz (1986) , one characteristic feature of caricatured exaggeration, especially in environments where speakers' positions are being staked out, is extreme-case formulation. As Pomerantz discovered, extreme-case formulations are semantically markedthat is to say, they are descriptions at their adjectival limits -and have an interactional grammar different from other, non-extreme descriptions. Since then researchers have found that extreme case formulations have powerful rhetorical effects in a variety of sites -for example, in the expression of attitudes (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) , givings of accounts (Antaki, 1994) , descriptions of events (Wooffitt, 1992; Edwards, 1994) and facts (Potter, 1996) . Indeed, it is easy to see extreme-case formulations in many of the concessions in our data, as in this one: The structure is used to support a concession with three extreme-case descriptions: that any one of us could do something, but that nobody would take a blind bit of notice (as well as the rhetorical commonplace stand on a street corner) to mark the concession as a caricature. Note that we don't mean that there is a 'real', objectively different and truer description. What we mean is that a description like this is markedly at odds with something unmarked and hearably more 'neutral' or hearably more 'favourable'. When we say caricature, we mean to signal not a contrast with the 'truth' but rather that the description is hearably marked in a certain direction; what is at issue (for analysts) is not the reality of what is described but the interests the description serves (Edwards and Potter, 1992) .
Here Again see the caricature coming at a specific place in the structure: she could have 'easily sat down and said I'm not doing anything else'; she could 'go on the sick for the rest of your life'; all extreme cases. And, once again, this provides for her talk being heard as emphatically robust. The speaker is not only to be understood as defending her claim (that she had to change) against potential challenge, but going on to dismiss the alternative as being merely absurd.
A more subtle use of exaggeration and caricature is when it is ostensibly used against the speaker herself or himself, admitting an extreme description which is so unacceptable as to be hearably crazy, as in this case: (14 Note the extreme case formulations ('no way'; 'hate'; 'shoot the lot of them') in the speaker's self-description. Indeed they are so extreme as to qualify them as being what Torode (1996) calls 'impossible' descriptions, whose interactional grammar strongly disposes towards absurd non-seriousness. Here the very impossibility of the description has the rhetorical effect of disarming the hearer. It is a subtle way of doing what Edwards and Potter (1992) call 'stake inoculation', that is, providing evidence to fend off the implication that the speaker has a stake in the matter. The position described is so extreme as to be absurd and therefore false; indeed, the interviewer (line 8) orients to its literally 'laughable' character.
Here is a further example of an impossible description which makes the concession absurd: (15) ience or something' (in British usage a 'public convenience' is a public toilet). As Torode (1996) shows, the next description along can now be still more extreme, falling over into 'impossibility', and, indeed F's concession is the hearably absurdly impossible case of Charles getting pregnant (line 13).
One version of extreme-case formulation that merits special mention is trivialization. In example 12, for example, a speaker conceded that things are different elsewhere, but trivialized it as 'I mean, you've got these you've got these kings of Spain and king of somewhere or other' (italics added). Here is a similarly economical example, where an enormous amount of rhetorical work is done by the particle 'or whatever' (line 10): The 'or whatever' in line 9 nicely undoes the commitment that the speaker has just expressed; the issue is now implicitly so trivial that any throwaway list of policies would do equally well.
'STING IN THE TAIL' CONCESSIONS
The second of the three ways we found for speakers to make their dismissals more emphatic was by amplifying the negativity of the original proposition when the reprise slot opens up. The sharpest version of this was for the speaker explicitly to mobilize something actually in the conceded material. The speaker puts a sting in the tail of the concession by turning the tables on the opposition's case at the point where a simple reprise would have come (line 6). In the following example, the sting in the tail is a similar tu quoque; in spite of the concession, the others are 'just as bad ' (line 8 As before, the speaker is exploiting the expectable regularity of the structure by inserting into the reprise slot something which is a specific, 'you too' denunciation of the case that the speaker has just conceded.
CHEAPENING: WHEN A 'POSITIVE' CONCESSION CAN NEVERTHELESS BE

DISMISSIVE
We found a number of cases where a 'positive', non-caricature, non-extreme case description, once put into a concession, had the compelling rhetorical effect of cheapening the opposition's case. Consider this example: (19) The speaker 'concedes' that 'Maori culture [. . .] it's a good culture, it's really important'. But there is something peculiar going on. To 'genuinely' concede something is, surely, to allow something which is not already self-evident (in Gricean terms, to concede what is agreed would surely offend against the maxim of quality, at least). So for the speaker to cast the goodness and importance of Maori culture as a concession is, pragmatically, to imply that the goodness and importance of Maori culture is not self-evident. That is hearably dismissive.
Here is another example of the same cheapening strategy: (20) Saying 'what the government may do may not be right' seems to work as a bona fide concession -it concedes something which would, at face value, be held to be true and relevant by the opposition. But to make a show of treating such a thing as government wrongdoing as a concession is once again to display that while it might matter to the opposition it is (merely) a concession from the point of view of the speaker. The elegance of examples 19 and 20 is that by making a show of a concession, the speaker signals that it is the other side who hold something to be certain and relevant; the speakers themselves have had (visibly) to be convinced. (If we may use a dramatic example of our time, to 'concede' that six million people died (i.e. were killed) in the Nazi Holocaust is, rhetorically, not a concession but an insult.)
Concluding comments
This article has identified a regular conversational structure (proposition -concession -reprise) which makes a show of conceding and, in making such a show, fortifies the speaker's position against misunderstanding or attack, and, given extra fuel, goes on the offensive against the opposition.
The structure is public, and intelligible to any user of the language (English, in all our cases). It is marked out by two small sets of markers (concession markers like 'okay', 'allright', 'fair enough' and so on) and contrast markers (principally 'but') and unfolds in a clear, usually close, sequence. It is usually in the hands of the speaker, but may be built up by an ensemble of people together. If the reprise is an exact and immediate restatement of the proposition, then the rhetorical effect is graphic. Less ringing restatement, or greater distance between original and reprise, muffles the effect.
The structure attends to some vulnerability of stake or interest (as Edwards and Potter, 1992, call it) in the speaker's starting claim: if, for example, one says 'there's no way I can influence the Federation of Labour' (to take the example we started with), then one courts rhetorical disaster from the simple objection that logically there are plenty of ways. One could buy them off, infiltrate them, and so on. The concession that the speaker is 'willing to shoot the lot of them' attends to that; it shows that he can conceive of that way of 'influencing them', but shows us that he doesn't mean that sort of influence, and that no-one could accuse him of not having thought it through. That concession allows him then simply to reassert his proposition, in exactly the same words ('but I can't influence them') and make it sound as if it has been proofed against criticism.
The structure is not only defensive. It can be exploited to demean the other side. A speaker can use the structure as a Trojan Horse and insert into its framework an extreme-case formulation ('any of us could stand on a street corner and shout'), an impossible description ('if one of them gets pregnant fine it's headline news, specially if it's Charles') or a trivialization ('you've got these kings of Spain and king of somewhere or other') to make the dismissal stronger. A speaker can also, in what we call 'sting in the tail' concessions, exploit the structure by reprising the original claim in more extreme terms, designed specifically to squash the objection raised in the conceded material ('Christ wouldn't have been out there protesting either'). The structure is so powerful that it can even be used to corrupt something the other side could (ostensibly) hardly object to. To concede something that the opposition counts as self-evident (the importance of Maori culture, for example) is to treat it as patently not self-evident.
The structure is one that language users have in their armoury of rhetorical devices, alongside -but different from -other ways of 'conceding'. It is part of that suite of discursive devices (like disclaimers, 'stake inoculations' -Potter, 1996 -and so on) which attend to a speaker's perceived stake or interest as Edwards and Potter (1992) put it, and it is a particularly elegant one. It makes a show of using a form which, ostensibly, is evidence that the speaker appreciates the other side's point of view, displaying to listeners that the speaker is not wholly blind to others' positions. The peculiar power of the proposition -concessionreprise structure, of course, is that by making a show of the concessionary gift the speaker corrupts it.
Our insistence on the power of the conversational structure of propositionconcession -reprise is perhaps to be contrasted with (and made complementary to) the sort of claim made by other analysts who are more attuned to the political content of discourse. A good comparison is with what van Dijk calls 'apparent admissions' (Van Dijk, 1991: 188) where the arguer will, for example, palliate a racist statement about a group by conceding that it does not 'of course' apply to all of its members. The difference is that we arrive at a judgement that a concession is doing its work not by making an interpretation of whether one part of the talk counts as racist and that, next to it, a concession counts as a palliative, but by observing the rhetorical structure with its markers and sequential development. The proposition -concesssion -reprise structure can be used to dismiss rival claims of any sort. We saw it applied to mundane matters like the pros and cons of making beer from a home brew kit, the changes wrought by being ill, and the efficiency of the police in returning stolen property, as well as more obviously ideological matters such as the rights of Maoris in New Zealand, or the status of the Royal Family in Britain.
There may, however, be a lot of usage of this structure in hearably ideological talk, especially talk which comes across as expressing 'strong views' in the service of ideology (Billig, 1989) . Indeed it is the sort of device that might be particularly advantageously used when the speaker is in an environment where being rational and fairminded is at a premium (in that sense, it is like the structures of 'pseudo-argumentation' that Kleiner, 1998, has recently uncovered) . That suggests that a fruitful convergence between the content of talk and its detailed organization is possible. We might come to see the proposition -concesssionreprise structure as being one of the ways in which talk is signalled as being about controversial and disputable matters, with the twist that it does so while, at the same time, proving the speaker against complaint. The transcription symbols used here are a reduced set mostly derived from those developed by Gail Jefferson (see Atkinson and Heritage, 1984: ix-xvi Note that the use of bold and italics in the data extracts is purely to highlight elements of the concession structure.
